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There is a simple argument that Descartes is committed to the thesis that bodies move 
bodies. The argument runs:  
MINDS—Descartes is committed to the thesis that minds move bodies.1 
PARITY—If Descartes is committed to the thesis that minds move bodies, 
he is committed to the thesis that bodies move bodies.  Hence, 
BODIES—Descartes is committed to the thesis that bodies move bodies. 
 
If the argument is sound, the common view that MINDS is true and BODIES is false 
it itself false and unstable.  If the argument is sound, it illuminates Descartes’s views on 
the role of the senses in justifying metaphysical theses and protecting the mind-body 
union and illuminates his rationalism and its limits. 
I argue it is sound. 
 
1 
What Descartes is committed to if MINDS and BODIES are true is not that any mind moves 
any body or that any body moves any other body.  He is just committed to the claim that 
there is some mind that moves some body and that some body moves some body. 
The claim that some body moves some body is stronger than the claim that bodies 
have causal powers or that bodies exercise those powers.  There are causal powers other 
than the power to move a body: the power to produce a sensation, the power to hold 
another body still, etc.  Hence, that bodies have causal powers is weaker than the claim 
that bodies move bodies. I defend that Descartes commits to the stronger claim.   
                                                           
1 I mean “human minds” by “minds” unless otherwise noted. 
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Furthermore, I focus on a certain type of causing to move, namely, initiating 
motion, as when one billiard ball smashes into and, as a result, moves a stationary one.  
There are other ways of getting bodies to move: deflecting, channelling, etc.2  I argue for 
BODIES, largely, by arguing that Descartes commits to bodies initiating motion in other 
bodies.  So, unless otherwise noted, when I use “body-body causation,” I mean bodies 
moving bodies and, more particularly, doing so by initiating motion.  And, unless 
otherwise noted, the bodies I have in mind are medium-sized dry goods and not, for 
example, the universe. 
Finally, I say that Descartes “commits” to the theses that minds move bodies and 
that bodies move bodies.  I choose the word advisedly.  It raises two issues: 
a. What does Descartes say about what moves what?   
b. What does his system imply about what moves what? 
 
On (a): I think that what he says quite clearly implies that minds and bodies move 
bodies.  But formidable scholars disagree and I won’t place much emphasis on this.  The 
issue comes up mainly when I take up occasionalism, the view that God alone causes 
effects, at the end of the paper. 
What I am mainly interested in is (b) and what Descartes’s system—his overall 
metaphysics and epistemology—implies about minds and bodies moving bodies.  I argue 
that Descartes allows certain evidence for certain claims and that evidence implies that 
minds and bodies move bodies.  I also concede that there is a powerful case that the 
Cartesian system implies that bodies do not move bodies.  I argue that the case, mutatis 
mutandis, implies that minds do not move bodies. 
                                                           
2  Elisabeth highlights ways other than impulsion that a body might move a body.  See AT III 660.  
Descartes, discussing the laws of motion in the Principles, discusses rebounding and deflecting at II.39, 
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In what follows, I defend each of the two premises in my argument for BODIES.    
The case for MINDS, for Descartes’s commitment to the thesis that minds move bodies, is 
handled first and handled quickly.  Although I am convinced that premise is true, it is 
relatively unimportant.  The focus of the paper is on PARITY and those who insist 
Descartes is an occasionalist—and hence deny the first premise—might accept PARITY.  
At the end of the paper, I evaluate the case for an occasionalist interpretation of 
Descartes. 
The bulk of the paper comes in between.  In it, I go through the case for PARITY 
and some objections to it, showing how none quite succeeds. 
 
2 
Descartes says many times and very clearly that minds move bodies and says many times 
and very clearly things that imply they do.  When pressed by commentators to explain 
how minds move bodies, he never denies that they do; he just asserts that they do.   
Moreover, he claims to have good evidence that minds move bodies.  For 
example, he writes to Arnauld, 
That the mind, which is incorporeal, can set a body in motion is...shown to 
us...by the surest and plainest everyday experience.  It is one of those self-
evident things which we only make obscure when we try to explain…in 
terms of other things.  (AT V 222; CSMK: 358) 
 
That is, minds can move bodies.  And the evidence we have that they do is that we 
perceive cases of minds moving bodies. 
 When Burman asks, “How can the soul be affected by the body and vice versa, 
when their natures are completely different?”  Descartes responds, “This is very difficult 
                                                           
II.40 and what follows. 
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to explain; but here our experience is sufficient, since it is so clear on this point that it just 
cannot be gainsaid” (AT V 163; CSMK: 346).3  Among the ways we experience our 
minds affecting our bodies is feeling our minds move our bodies. 
This is the case for 
MINDS—Descartes is committed to the thesis that minds move bodies: 
Descartes says that minds move bodies repeatedly.  He has what is, by his own lights, 
good evidence for it. Whenever he is challenged about how minds move bodies, he never 
denies that they do, which is what you would expect from him if he denies or is unsure of 
the thesis that minds move bodies.  (Garber (1992a) and (1993) and Gorham (2004) argue 
similarly.)4 
 
3 
MINDS is slightly controversial.  Norman Kemp Smith, Gary Hatfield, and Jorge Secada, 
for example, have denied it in Kemp Smith (1953), Hatfield (1979), and Secada (2000).  
In Machamer and McGuire (2009) and Ott (2009), Peter Machamer, J.E. McGuire, and 
Walter Ott deny that, in his later works, Descartes goes for the thesis that minds move 
bodies.  Though I disagree with them about MINDS, much of the argument of the paper is 
acceptable to them.  Almost all of the rest of the paper is a defense of  
PARITY—If Descartes is committed to the thesis that minds move bodies, 
                                                           
3 See, too, this bit of a letter to Elisabeth: “What belongs to the union of the soul and the body [including 
the mind’s power to move a body]…is known very clearly by the senses.  That is why people who never 
philosophize and use only their senses have no doubt that the soul moves the body…. Everyone feels that 
he is a single person with both body and thought so related by nature that the thought can move the body 
and feel the things which happen to it” (AT III 691-692 and 694; CSMK: 227-228). 
4 There might be another case for the thesis that minds move bodies, namely, that minds’ ability to move 
bodies is crucial for protecting the union of mind and body and, because of this, a good God would have set 
the world up so that each of our minds moves its own body.  For reasons that will become clear in §4, I 
believe an analogous, equally plausible case can be made for the thesis that bodies move bodies. 
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he is committed to the thesis that bodies move bodies. 
 
 
Kemp Smith, et al. can accept PARITY.  They might well endorse it since it can be 
used to support their own view.  Whereas I think MINDS is true and, with PARITY, it 
implies  
BODIES—Descartes is committed to the thesis that bodies move bodies, 
 
Kemp Smith, et al. think BODIES is false and, with PARITY, that implies MINDS is false. 
Defending PARITY, I argue  
The sort of evidence Descartes has supporting the thesis that minds move 
bodies supports that bodies move bodies. 
The sort of evidence Descartes has telling against the thesis that bodies 
move bodies tells against the thesis that minds move bodies.  Hence, 
PARITY 
 
The case for—and against—the second premise will be detailed at length.  First, the first 
premise, the case for which is brief and straightforward: The evidence Descartes has for 
minds moving bodies is sense evidence.  That evidence also supports that bodies move 
bodies.  Just as the surest and plainest everyday experience gives us evidence that minds 
move bodies, so it gives us evidence that bodies move bodies: You feel your finger 
scratching your bug bite, moving it back and forth.  You feel your face pushing into a 
pillow as you fall asleep.5 
It might be objected that this evidence is not, by Descartes’s lights, good 
evidence.  The plainest everyday experience, after all, seems to show that the ocean is 
blue or that some space is empty, and Descartes does not think we have good evidence 
                                                           
5  Gorham accepts MINDS on the basis that Descartes endorses that minds move bodies repeatedly and 
claims that sensory evidence establishes that they do (Gorham (2004): 390, 403, 405).  Gorham denies 
BODIES but, I think, acknowledges the prima facie case for PARITY. 
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that the ocean is blue or that space is empty.   
There is no problem for PARITY here or my argument for it.  Which isn’t to say 
there is no problem.  In some cases, Descartes denies that the senses provide good 
evidence; in others, he accepts they provide good evidence: What’s the difference?  This 
is a real problem—a problem with no obvious solution—precisely because Descartes 
does seem to think that the senses provide evidence for the thesis that minds move 
bodies.  Descartes is clear on what grounds he holds that minds move bodies—it is 
evident, thanks to the senses.  It might be that these are bad grounds and Descartes should 
give them up.  But in the correspondence with Arnauld (AT V 222; CSMK: 358), 
Burman (AT V 163; CSMK: 346), and Elisabeth (AT III 691-692 and AT III 694; 
CSMK: 227 and 228) and elsewhere, it is clear that he doesn’t give them up.  And those 
grounds support the thesis that bodies move bodies.  So the sort of evidence Descartes 
has for the thesis that minds move bodies—sense evidence—is equally well evidence for 
the thesis that bodies move bodies.  That is, the first premise in the argument for PARITY 
is true. 
 
4 
Arguing for 
PARITY—If Descartes is committed to the thesis that minds move bodies, 
he is committed to the thesis that bodies move bodies. 
 
I claimed 
The sort of evidence Descartes has supporting that minds move bodies 
supports that bodies move bodies. 
 
And noted that sense perception supports both.  I then noted it’s possible that, by 
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Descartes’s lights, sense perception supports neither since, by Descartes’s lights, it is no 
evidence at all.  But that is no problem for PARITY or my argument for it.  It would show 
that, by Descartes’s lights, sense evidence gives the same support—none—to the theses 
that minds move bodies and bodies do. 
More troubling for my argument is the claim that although you feel mind-body 
causation—feel your desire to raise your arm moving your arm, say—you do not feel 
body-body causation.  You do not, for example, feel billiard balls moving each other 
about or bumper cars bumping into each other.  So Descartes’s evidence supporting that 
minds move bodies does not support that bodies move bodies.  Hence, my argument for 
PARITY is unsound. 
The billiard ball and bumper car points are of course correct but just establish that 
some body-body causation is not sense-perceptible.  That is consistent with our having 
sense evidence for other instances of body-body causation.  For example, consider a 
needle pushing into your arm as you get a shot.  You can feel the needle—that body—
moving your body.  Descartes insists on this in Meditation Six when he claims that, to 
protect ourselves, each person senses whether her body is being “affected by various 
beneficial or harmful bodies which surround it” (AT VII 81; CSM II: 56).  That is, he 
thinks we feel what external bodies do to our body.  He is explicit about these feelings in 
the Elisabeth correspondence, writing, “everyone feels that he is a single person with 
both body and thought so related by nature that the thought can move the body and feel 
the things which happen to [the body]” (AT III 694; CSMK: 228; my emphasis).  That is, 
things happen to the body.  Through sense perception, our minds pick up on these things.  
As long as some of these things happening are bodies moving our bodies, this is a clear 
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statement that we sense bodies moving bodies.6 
So there is no difference having to do with our feeling causation between the 
evidence for minds moving bodies and the evidence for bodies moving bodies.  Descartes 
holds that we feel causation in neither case or we feel it in both.   
But this sets up a further objection to my argument for PARITY.  I claimed that 
Descartes’s evidence for minds moving bodies is sense evidence and sense evidence 
supports that bodies move bodies.  I have responded to objections that we feel causation 
in neither case and that we feel it only in the mind-body case.  But consider the objection 
that though we feel mind-body and body-body causation, only the former is evidence that 
minds move bodies or maybe only former is good evidence.   
The idea is that Descartes makes plain—in Meditation Six, Principles II.3, and 
elsewhere—that the senses are designed to preserve the mind-body union, not to discover 
                                                           
6  I think the Elisabeth letter makes the important phenomenological point that our minds perceive body-
body interactions as well as mind-body interactions.  Compare with Margaret Wilson who writes, 
How does the experience of pain demonstrate that the body of man is closely united to 
the mind?  In the Meditations Descartes argues that our sensible perceptions must be 
caused by bodies...But if this line of reasoning shows anything, it shows only that there 
are bodies that act on our mind; it does not by itself show that we are embodied, 'have 
bodies.’" ((1999): 218) 
   
I think this gets the phenomenology of sense perception wrong.  You step on a tack.  This hurts.  But that is 
not all we perceive—we don’t simply perceive a tack affecting our mind.  (What would that feel like?)  We 
perceive that something is damaging our foot—that is, that one body is affecting another body—and pain is 
the representation of damage. What we perceive is that certain body-body causation is painful. 
 And see Principles II.38’s claim that “The fact that air offers resistance to other moving bodies 
may be confirmed either by our own experience, through the sense of touch if we beat the air with a fan.” 
(AT VIIIA 63; CSM I: 241).  That is, we feel one body resisting some other body. 
 And see, too, with Simmons (2008) which points out Descartes holds that that we sense ownership 
of our bodies ((2008): 90) and need perception of body-body interactions—e.g. flexings of muscles—to 
perceive this ownership (91). 
 Another phenomenological point: In Meditation Six, the Elisabeth letter, and elsewhere, Descartes 
insists that our mind can move the body and we are aware of our mind doing so.  In some cases, I think, 
perception of mind-body causation is filtered through perception of body-body causation.  Sometimes when 
you feel your mind moving your body around, what you feel is partly bits of your body moving other 
bodies around.  For example, when you raise your arm underwater, you feel your arm pushing against the 
water.  This is how you know your desire to move your arm is in fact moving your arm. 
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the truth about, say, the nature of bodies or minds.  Perhaps, then, Descartes believes that 
they are especially good at figuring out whether minds move bodies since this talent 
would be crucial to preserving the mind-body union.  It is crucial to preserve your mind-
body union, for example, that you be able to figure out whether your mind has pulled 
your hand—or your head—out of a flame.  Perhaps, also, Descartes believes that the 
senses are not especially good at figuring out whether bodies move bodies since this 
talent is not crucial to preserving the mind-body union.  It is not crucial to preserve your 
mind-body union, for example, to know that dogs move dirt when digging or that that 
billiard ball moved this one.  If so, the sensory evidence we have for the thesis that minds 
move bodies is better than the sensory evidence we have for the thesis that bodies move 
bodies: When the senses attest to mind-body causation, they are doing their job.  Not so 
when they attest to body-body causation.  If so, the first premise in my argument for 
PARITY, namely, 
The sort of evidence Descartes has supporting that minds move bodies 
supports that bodies move bodies. 
 
is wrong. 
Partly, the foregoing objection is correct: Descartes holds that to protect the mind-
body union, the senses have to figure out whether minds move bodies.7  Partly, it’s 
                                                           
7 As Malebranche points out, Descartes is wrong about this.  To protect the union, minds needn’t perceive 
causation.  They could do so simply by knowing which events follows which.  So, for example, to protect 
your union your mind needn’t be aware that fire is burning your hand but only be aware that there’s some 
fire and your hand is in it and, when that happens, bad results follow. 
Malebranche agrees with Descartes that the senses are designed to protect the mind-body union 
(Search After Truth I.5.1).  Yet they do this job, Malebranche holds, in spite of occasionalism being true 
(Search After Truth VI.2.3).  Whether they need to perceive causation to do a good job is less clear. 
To be clear, there is no problem for PARITY here, though there might be a problem for the claims 
that we have good sensory evidence for causation and the claim that perceiving causation is useful to 
protect our unions.  Whether Descartes or Malebranche is right about these claims raises a couple of subtle 
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incorrect: Descartes also holds that to protect the mind-body union, the senses have to 
figure out whether bodies move bodies.  As noted earlier, Meditation Six makes the point 
clearly: Descartes holds that to protect yourself, you have to be able to tell whether your 
body is being “affected by various beneficial or harmful bodies which surround it” (AT 
VII 81; CSM II: 56).  When you are in pain, you need to know not just that your body is 
damaged, you need to know what is causing the damage and how.  For example, you 
need to know whether you are being hurt by external bodies—tacks, flames, bears—or 
internal ones—dropsy drying out your throat (AT VII 84; CSM II: 58).8 
The senses might be quite good at determining that bodies move bodies: That 
thesis follows from facts the senses are adept at detecting, namely, that a body is harming 
or benefitting our body.  And they might be quite good at determining that bodies move 
bodies even if, as Descartes routinely insists, they are lousy at metaphysics. 
 
5 
Of course, this case for 
BODIES—Descartes is committed to the thesis that bodies move bodies 
                                                           
issues—what it is to perceive causation and whether Malebranche’s view is consistent with a non-
deceptive, good God—but Descartes doesn’t engage with these issues, they are irrelevant to my argument 
for PARITY, and I put them aside. 
For more on the relations between Descartes’s and Malebranche’s views on the role of the senses 
in protecting the mind-body union, see Simmons (2008).  Simmons (1999) contains extended discussion of 
Descartes’s views on the topic. 
8 Principles IV.197 supports this, claiming that we perceive body-body causation as when we perceive a 
sword cutting our body (AT VIIIA 321; CSM I: 284).  See, too, Principles I.71 on how sense perception 
makes us aware of external bodies—and leads us to make erroneous judgments about them (AT VIIIA 35-
36; CSM I: 218-219).  And note that though Descartes singles out various ways in which the senses lead us 
astray here, he fails to note that they lead us astray when they lead us to judge that bodies affect our bodies, 
including moving our bodies.  Principles IV.191 describes our sensations of touch as an awareness of how 
other bodies are rubbing nerves near the skin (AT VIIIA 318; CSM I: 281-282).  Similar descriptions of our 
perception of body-body causation are in The Treatise on Man.  For example, AT XI 143-144; CSM I: 102-
103. 
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is defeasible.  It might be that Descartes is committed to theses that imply that bodies do 
not move bodies and that those commitments are stronger or more plausible than his 
commitment to the theses that bodies do move bodies.  If so, then perhaps we shouldn’t 
go for BODIES.  Is it so?  
There are several reasons to think it is.  
 First, the thesis that bodies move bodies seems inconsistent with Descartes’s 
theory of God’s role in the material world.  Most clearly, that bodies move bodies seems 
inconsistent with the way that theory is developed in Principles 2:36-45 (AT VIIIA 61-
67; CSM I: 240-244).  In Principles II.36, for example, Descartes writes 
God is the primary cause of motion....In the beginning...he created matter, 
along with its motion and rest; and now, merely by his regular 
concurrence, he preserves the same amount of motion and rest in the 
material universe as he put there in the beginning.  (AT VIIIA 61; CSM I: 
240) 
 
So far, no problem for the thesis that bodies move bodies.  There is a problem for the 
thesis that bodies are a primary cause of motion, but BODIES doesn’t claim that.9  There 
would be a problem for BODIES if the commitment to God as a primary cause ruled out 
there being other causes of motion.  But it doesn’t.  In fact, Descartes goes on to single 
out the laws of nature as causes of motion.10  But that’s the rub: He does not single out 
bodies and, so the objection to BODIES goes, would have if BODIES were true.  Moreover, 
the explanation Descartes gives of the laws of motion show that there is no room for 
bodies in the causation of motion.  For example, explaining the third law of motion, 
                                                           
9  Schmaltz (2007) thoroughly, helpfully discusses Descartes’s concept of a primary cause.  For interesting 
criticism, see Platt (2011a): 642-643. 
10  The idea of laws as causes is strange.  Hattab (2007) and Ott (2009) helpfully spell the idea out, differing 
on some key points. 
  
12 
 
Descartes writes, 
[I]t is clear that when he created the world in the beginning God did not 
only impart various motions to different parts of the world, but also 
produced all the reciprocal impulses and transfers of motion between the 
parts.  Thus, since God preserves the world by the selfsame action and in 
accordance with the selfsame laws as when he created it, the motion which 
he preserves is not something permanently fixed in given pieces of matter, 
but something which is mutually transferred when collisions occur… (AT 
VIIIA 66; CSM I: 243) 
 
And this echoes II.36: 
God imparted various motions to the parts of matter when he first created 
them, and he now preserves all this matter in the same way, and by the 
same process by which he originally created it… (AT VIIIA 62; CSM I: 
240 
 
The objection to BODIES here is that these passages show that God does all the moving of 
bodies that seems to be done by bodies. 
Crucially, there is no problem for the thesis that minds move bodies here since the 
Principles explicitly—see Principles II.40—limits its scope to the material world.  So 
when I argued for 
PARITY—If Descartes is committed to the thesis that minds move bodies, 
he is committed to the thesis that bodies move bodies 
 
by claiming that 
The sort of evidence Descartes has telling against the thesis that bodies 
move bodies tells against the thesis that minds move bodies 
 
I was mistaken.  The metaphysics of causation Descartes develops in the Principles tells 
against the thesis that bodies move bodies without telling against the thesis that minds do. 
  About Principles 2:36-45, Garber writes, 
The picture in [these passages] is reasonably clear: God stands behind the 
world of bodies and is the direct cause of their motion....[I]n Descartes’ 
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new philosophy, the characteristic behavior of bodies is explained in terms 
of an immutable God sustaining the motion of bodies.  I think it is 
reasonably clear, then, that in the material world, at least, God is the only 
causal agent.  (Garber (1993): 207-208; cf. Garber (1992a): 280-293, 
Gorham (2004): 402, and Machamer and McGuire (2009): 136) 
 
 I disagree with Garber’s reading.  There is another way to read the relevant bit of 
the Principles so it is consistent with the thesis that bodies move bodies. Consider five 
pictures of God’s place in a pool hall: 
1. Deism—God creates a pool table and the laws of motion, gives the balls an initial 
shove, then the balls do the rest. 
2. Conservationism—God creates the pool table and the laws of motion, gives the 
balls an initial shove, keeps the balls and table from falling out of existence, and 
then the balls do the rest. 
3. Concurrentism—God creates the pool table and the laws of motion, gives the 
balls an initial shove, keeps the balls and table from falling out of existence, and 
then knocks the balls against each other.  That is, the God pushes the balls and the 
balls then push other balls. 
4. Divine Shovism—God creates the pool table and the laws of motion, gives the 
balls an initial shove, keeps the balls and the table from falling out of existence, 
and then pushes each ball Himself.  No ball pushes another.  (“Divine shove” is 
from Garber (1993): 208.) 
5. Cinematism—God creates the pool table and the laws of motion.  The world 
keeps falling out of existence and God keeps remaking it.  But he remakes slightly 
differently each time.  So someone watching the pool table might get the 
impression that a ball is moving but, really, what’s happening is that God makes 
that ball first in one place, then in another, then in another, etc. 
 
Obviously, these pictures are sketches of caricatures.  But they needn’t be any more 
detailed since the point I want to make is just that the passages from the Principles that 
are supposed to tell against BODIES are clearly inconsistent with Deism but also not 
inconsistent with any of the other positions.  Recently, Schmaltz (2007) makes at length 
the case that Descartes endorses the second option; Platt (2011a) and (2011b) at length 
makes the case that Descartes goes for the third.  If Descartes goes for either, then 
BODIES is true.  I am neutral as to which of those two Descartes goes for or should go for.  
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Defending BODIES doesn’t require taking a stand.  It just requires rebutting the argument 
against body-body causation stemming from the Principles.11  To do that, it is enough to 
show that that case can’t come from the Principles alone.  The three crucial passages 
quoted above do not show that the second or third pictures fail to capture Descartes’s 
view.  The case against those pictures capturing Descartes’s view will have to come at 
least partly from elsewhere.  I will consider some possibilities in the next couple sections. 
As far as the Principles itself, I think it is not only consistent with the second or 
third picture but in fact endorses one or the other.  For consider the heading of Principles 
II.43, “The nature of the power which all bodies have to act on, or resist, other bodies.”  
This heading clearly presupposes that bodies have a power to act on other bodies.  If the 
power were God’s entirely, wouldn’t this article be the place to say so? 
It doesn’t say that.  It turns out in Principles II.43 that this power derives from 
God but not in a way that undermines the thesis that bodies move bodies.  Descartes 
writes, 
…[W]e must be careful to note what it is that constitutes the power of any 
body to act on…another body.  This power consists simply in the fact that 
everything tends, so far as it can, to persist in the same state, as laid down 
in the first law.  (AT VIIIA 66; CSM I: 243) 
 
Introducing that first law of motion in Principles II.37, Descartes writes that it follows 
from God’s immutability (AT VIIIA 62; CSM I: 240).  So, again, my interpretation of the 
Principles is that God does “stand behind” the world of bodies in that he created the 
world of bodies and motion and rest, that world depends on him for its continued 
existence, and its laws follow from his nature.  This is all consistent with BODIES and 
                                                           
11  Compare: We could defend MINDS without deciding whether Descartes goes for the mental analogs of 
conservationism or concurrentism. 
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MINDS, though, and consistent with God being the primary cause of all motion, that 
caused by bodies and that caused by minds.12 
 Support for this interpretation comes from Principles II.40 in which Descartes 
claims that “all the particular causes of the changes which bodies undergo are covered by 
[the] third laws—or at least the law covers all the changes which are themselves 
corporeal” (AT VIIIA 65; CSM I: 242).  Della Rocca argues this passage should in fact 
be translated so it finishes “all the particular causes of changes which are themselves 
corporeal,” and since Descartes is clearly presupposing that there are such changes, this 
strongly supports BODIES ((1999): 53).  But even using the CSM translation, the passage 
seems to be to be endorsing not just that bodies change but that bodily changes are 
produced by other bodies.  So long as some of these changes are changes in movement, 
BODIES is true. 
And the contents of the laws themselves spell out that bodies move bodies: they 
halt them, deflect them, rebound off them.  When he glosses the laws to Clerselier in a 
1645 letter, there is no mention of God (AT IV 183-188; CSMK: 248).  When he proves 
the first part of the third law of motion, Descartes writes, “If one body collides with a 
                                                           
12  Della Rocca argues that close textual analysis of the Principles, especially II.37, II.40, II. 43, II.45, and 
III.56, supports BODIES even more strongly than I have suggested here.  See Della Rocca (1999), especially 
pp. 52-62.  Della Rocca (2007) summarizes the argument.  Platt (2011b) comes to the same conclusion—
that the passages from the Principles that supposedly tell against BODIES in fact support it—but takes a 
different path to it. 
 In The World, Descartes lays out laws of motion that also seem to me to imply that bodies move 
bodies (AT XI 37-46; CSM I: 92-97).  Machamer and McGuire accept that those laws do imply that bodies 
move bodies.  They differ from me when they claim that Descartes’s changed his view about whether 
bodies move bodies during the span from The World to The Principles.  Engaging with Machamer and 
McGuire’s extremely subtle argument would make this paper twice as long. The face-value reading of The 
Principles is endorsed in Cottingham (1997): 163.  The similarity between Descartes’s views on body-body 
causation in The World and The Principles is endorsed in Platt (2011b): 864. 
 Ott notes that The World explicitly says that bodies are particular causes of motion in its second 
law and notes that the Principles does not.  Ott puts this difference to work in his argument that Descartes 
is an occasionalist ((2009): 58). 
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second, hard body in its path which it is quite incapable of pushing…”  It is very hard to 
resist that idea that Descartes believes some bodies are capable of pushing others.  If so, 
BODIES is true. 
But significantly better scholars than I have resisted that Descartes holds that 
bodies can push other bodies.  Consider this bit from Garber, 
One way or another Descartes holds that it is an immutable God whose 
divine sustenance is responsible for the various laws Descartes posits, for 
the conservation of quantity of motion, for the persistence of motion, for 
the orderly exchange of motion in collision.  This suggests that the force 
Descartes appeals to in [the third law, namely imparted in collisions], and 
the tendency a body has in its state derive from God, from the immutable 
way in which he sustains the world he creates, in particular, from the way 
in which he sustains the bodies in motion in that world.  In this way force 
is not in bodies themselves (Garber (1992a): 320). 
 
I agree with all of the first sentence.  Descartes holds that, in some way or other, God—
due to His simplicity and immutability—is responsible for the laws of nature and, 
because of this, responsible for the conservation of quantity of motion, etc.  And I agree 
that if bodies move bodies, their power to do so derives in some way from God.  What I 
disagree with is that it follows from this—or is even particularly good evidence—that 
bodies don’t move bodies. 
To be clear, I have been arguing so far that the Principles-based case against 
BODIES is not particularly strong.  As far as PARITY is concerned, that is neither here nor 
there.  But what I have argued so far has the following upshot: A case just like the 
Principles-based case against BODIES can be made against MINDS.  And, I think, that case 
against MINDS—just as PARITY predicts—is no stronger than the case against BODIES.  
My interpretation of Descartes’s view of God’s role in body-body causation can be 
adapted to resolve a tension in Descartes’s views about the thesis that minds move 
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bodies.  On the one hand, he clearly seems to hold that thesis and plainly asserts it in the 
correspondence with Elisabeth.  On the other, he also writes to Elisabeth, 
All the reasons that prove that God…is the first and immutable cause of 
all effects that do not depend on human free will prove similarly, I think, 
that he is also the cause of all the effects that do so depend…. 
[G]od is the universal cause of everything in such a way as to be the total 
cause of everything…  (AT IV 314; CSMK: 272)13 
 
This looks to deny that minds move bodies because it looks to say God is the cause of all 
effects that (seem to) depend on our minds.  If by “first cause,” though, Descartes means 
what I think he means by “primary cause,” there is no problem here.  (AT uses the same 
expression “la cause premiere” in both this letter and Principles II.36.)  I read this 
passage to Elisabeth as a reminder that what happens in the world goes according to 
God’s plans, not a denial of mind-body causation.  In fact, I believe Descartes is 
assuming that minds move bodies in the passage.  Its first sentence claims that God is 
“the cause of all the effects that do depend [on human free will].”  This assumes that 
there are effects of free will and, hence, with the plausible assumption that some effects 
of free will are bodily movements, it assumes the thesis that minds move bodies is true.  
This reading gets support from the 1645 letter in which Descartes insists to Elisabeth that 
mind-body causation is consistent with finite beings depending for their continued 
existence on God.  Geoff Gorham reads these bits of the Elisabeth correspondence 
similarly: It is consistent with—and, in fact, endorses—that minds move bodies while 
also giving God an important causal role ((2004): 416-420).  I differ from Gorham in 
holding that the Principles should be read in the same way: They are consistent with—
                                                           
13 Clatterbaugh notes that this passage supports the claim that Descartes is an occasionalist ((1999): 41).  
For if the passage shows that there is no mind-body causation, it would also show that there is no mind-
mind causation (as when your present mental state produces some later one) or body-body causation. 
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and, in fact, endorse—that bodies move bodies while also giving God an important causal 
role.14  But the truly important thing for this part of my argument isn’t the endorsement of 
bodies moving bodies or minds moving minds—that is important in §7—but, rather, the 
case for PARITY: In the Elisabeth correspondence, God is given a large role, a role that 
perhaps threatens to show minds don’t move bodies just as, in the Principles, God is 
given a large role, a role that perhaps threatens to show bodies don’t move bodies.  This 
is what my argument for PARITY predicts: The case stemming from Descartes’s 
metaphysics against the thesis that bodies move bodies is only as strong as the case 
against the thesis that minds move bodies. 
 
 
6 
I should be more cautious: The case stemming from God’s role in Descartes’s 
metaphysics is as strong against the thesis that bodies move bodies as against the thesis 
that minds move bodies.  But there are other aspects to Descartes’s metaphysics. 
Descartes thinks that the nature of body is merely being extended and that all the 
other intrinsic properties of bodies are modifications of extension.  Being shaped like a 
square, for example, is a modification of extension.  Being six feet tall, for example, is a 
modification of extension.  If bodies move bodies, bodies have the power to move bodies.  
Let us assume is an intrinsic property (but see footnote 16 for a case against the 
                                                           
14 Relatedly, see Descartes’s 1643 letter to Mersenne in which he claims that the laws of nature follow from 
God’s perfection and also claims that bodies impel each other.   
See, too, Descartes’s 1645 letter to the Marquess of Newcastle in which he asserts that God is the 
sole general cause of all things just after detailing several instances of body-body causation (AT IV 328; 
CSMK: 274-275).  Ott reads the letter as supporting Descartes’s occasionalism ((2009): 74), as supporting 
not just that BODIES is false but MINDS is, too.  But that reading makes Descartes’s letter bafflingly 
disjointed: He at first is asserting that bodies cause this and that and then, all of a sudden, is insisting that 
bodies cause nothing.  I think occasionalist readings of the Elisabeth correspondence are similarly 
  
19 
 
assumption).  So, if Descartes is right, it is a modification of extension.   
A case against BODIES now suggests itself: It is hard (impossible?) to see how 
something the nature of which is merely being extended can move a body.  So Descartes 
thinks bodies cannot move bodies.  So BODIES is false and Descartes denies that bodies 
move bodies. 
The argument is clearly invalid.  From the premises that it is hard to see how an 
essentially merely extended thing moves bodies, nothing follows about Descartes’s 
views.  From the premise that Descartes found it hard to see how an essentially merely 
extended thing moves bodies you could build a better case that BODIES is false.  Did 
Descartes find it hard to see how bodies move bodies?  There is some reason to think 
not.15  In Principles IV.198, Descartes contrasts our inability to understand how bodies 
could have substantial forms or scholastic real qualities with our ability to understand 
how one body can move another. 
We understand very well how the different size, shape, and motion of the 
particles of one body can produce various local motions in another body.  
But there is no way of understanding how these same attributes (size, 
shape, and motion) can produce…substantial forms and the real quality 
which many philosophers suppose to inhere in things.  (AT VIIIA 322; 
CSM I: 285) 
 
 In other words, not only do bodies move bodies but we understand how they do 
so.  What we don’t understand is how bodies can have, say, the real quality of heaviness.  
This is some evidence that Descartes thought it was not mysterious how bodies move 
bodies.  And nowhere that I know of does he puzzle over an essentially merely extended 
                                                           
disjointed. 
15  Gabbey (1980), Guerolt (1980), and Schmaltz (2007) defend at length that Descartes had an explanation 
of body-body causation with all three providing detailed accounts of force.  Della Rocca (2000), Hattab 
(2007), Pessin (2003), and Platt (2011a and 2011b) defend this at length with detailed accounts of 
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thing having the power to move another extended thing.  Compare that with an 
essentially merely extended thing being colored or having a form or thinking, all of 
which properties he explicitly denies that extended things have. 
For argument’s sake, though, assume that Descartes did find it puzzling how 
bodies move bodies.  Even if he did think there is such a mystery, however, there is no 
problem here for  
PARITY—If Descartes is committed to the thesis that minds move bodies, 
he is committed to the thesis that bodies move bodies 
 
To see there is no problem, consider the following: Descartes holds that the nature 
of minds is merely thinking.  So all the intrinsic properties of minds are modifications of 
thinking.  Having the power to move bodies is an intrinsic property of minds.  So it is a 
modification of thinking.  To see how something the nature of which is merely being a 
thinking thing can move bodies is hard (impossible?).  If it were not hard to see how 
minds move bodies, then Descartes would have explained how it happens to all of the 
many people who asked him how it happens.  So there is no problem for PARITY.  If it is 
hard to see how bodies move bodies, it is hard to see how minds do.  If unintelligibility 
considerations are evidence against body-body causation, so too are they evidence against 
mind-body causation.16 
                                                           
Descartes’s metaphysics of body-body causation. 
16 An objection to my claims here: It might be that the difficulty in seeing how minds move bodies is not 
evidence against mind-body causation since the power of mind to move bodies is a feature not of mind but, 
rather, of the mind-body union and we make no sense of the powers of the union.  In the correspondence 
with Elisabeth, Descartes concedes that it is unintelligible how minds move bodies.  This is, however, 
unsurprising to him since the notion of mind-body causation falls under the notion of the mind-body union: 
“we have…the notion of [the mind-body] union, on which depends our notion of the soul’s power to move 
the body” (AT III 665; CSMK: 218), and the notion of the mind-body union is, if not unintelligible, then 
close to it (AT III 692; CSMK: 227).   
By contrast, the power of body to move bodies is a feature of body and such features, Descartes 
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Fair enough.  But the previous objection to PARITY, though unpersuasive, is onto 
something.  Minds are at least active things, whereas bodies are passive.  So body-body 
causation is even less intelligible than mind-body causation—there is more of a case 
against the former than the latter. So there is a case against body-body causation that is 
not a case against mind-body causation.  So one premise of my argument for PARITY is 
false. 
Slightly more explicitly, the argument goes: According to Descartes, bodies are 
essentially merely extended.  Extension is passive.  Causal power, by contrast, is active.  
How could something essentially merely extended, then, have causal power?17   
Commentators have, largely, been unable to answer this question.  Body, they say, is 
                                                           
holds, “can…be known by the intellect alone, but much better by the intellect aided by the imagination” 
(AT III 691; CSMK: 227).  So whereas we ought not expect it to be intelligible how minds move bodies, 
we ought to expect it to be intelligible how bodies move bodies.  Since it is not intelligible how bodies 
move bodies, this is sufficient to reject that bodies do so. This might make for an objection to PARITY since 
the unintelligibility of body-body causation would be evidence against BODIES but the unintelligibility of 
mind-body causation would be no evidence against MINDS.  
This line of thought is mistaken.  One response, as I have emphasized, is to deny that Descartes 
finds body-body causation unintelligible.   
Another response comes from the view defended by Della Rocca (1999), Clarke (2000), and 
Pessin (2003) according to which causal powers are extrinsic properties of bodies derived from the will of 
God.  Unlike, say, shape, such properties needn’t be explained entirely in terms of extension and, hence, the 
difficulty in doing so is no problem.   
A third response goes as follows: Descartes was in two minds about whether the mind’s power to 
move bodies falls under the notion of the mind-body union.  On the one hand, he says, in correspondence 
with Elisabeth and in Meditation Six, that it does.  On the other, he says things implying it doesn’t.  For the 
minds of angels and God have the power to move bodies (see AT V 347; CSMK: 375; see Schmaltz 
(2007): 142 on disembodied mental causation). Theirs is simply a mental property, falling under the notion 
of mind, a notion that, unlike the notion of body, is best comprehended without help from the imagination 
(AT III 691; CSMK: 227).  So Descartes seems to me to be leaving it open that the power to move bodies is 
a feature of mind and not (merely) the mind-body union.  Doing so seems the more tenable position since it 
allows a human soul retains the power to move bodies after death; it just lacks a body to move.  But, if 
mind’s power to move bodies is a feature of mind rather than (merely) the union, and if it is hard to see 
how it has such a power, we shouldn’t brush this difficulty off on account of it stemming from the 
mysterious mind-body union. 
17 A question raised more or less pointedly by La Forge (I rely on Nadler (1998)), Le Grand (1694) (I rely 
on Clatterbaugh (1999)), Malebranche (1992), Hatfield (1977), Garber (1992), Simmons (2001), Schmaltz 
(2002), Machamer and McGuire (2009), and Hattab (2010). 
 Cottingham (1997) notes—and I wholeheartedly agree with this—that though Descartes’s 
commentators are quite skeptical of the idea that something that is essentially merely extended could move 
  
22 
 
passive.  By contrast, “How could something essentially merely thoughtful have causal 
power?” is not a hard question.  Thinking is an activity.  From all this, the objection goes, 
there is a Cartesian case against body-body causation that is clearly not applicable to 
mind-body causation.  Therefore, my argument for PARITY is unsound.18 
But what is meant by “active” and “passive” here?  The most straightforward way 
to understand the argument would be if all ‘active’ meant was ‘having causal power’ and 
all ‘passive’ meant were ‘lacking causal power.’  But then the argument against the thesis 
that bodies move bodies would be question-begging against those who hold that bodies 
move bodies and, hence, have causal power. 
Furthermore, the argument relies on the idea that the mind’s activity makes 
answering the question, “How do minds move bodies?” easier to answer than, “How do 
bodies move bodies?”  I think that’s a mistake.  For in trying to make sense of how minds 
move bodies, the issue is not whether minds can be active.  The issue is whether we can 
make sense of the idea that minds engage in a certain activity, moving bodies.  An 
example can make this point.  Say that my mind has a certain causal power—it produces 
inferences—that we can make perfect sense of.  Say that we now discover that my mind 
can also bend spoons from a distance.  How it can do this would be completely baffling.  
Noting that my mind is an active thing, I think, would not make seeing how my mind can 
bend spoons any less baffling.  What is wanted is an explanation for how minds engage 
in a certain activity; noting that they engage in some other activity doesn’t provide help 
to provide one.  And insisting that activity is a necessary condition for being able to move 
a body and, further, that minds meet that condition, bodies don’t just begs the question 
                                                           
something else that is merely extended, there is little evidence that Descartes himself thought this  (164). 
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against proponents of BODIES. 
Descartes had nothing helpful to say about how minds move bodies. He asserts, 
rightly, I think, that minds do move bodies and so it seems that MINDS is true.  If things 
are as they seem and MINDS is true and Descartes thinks it is mysterious how minds 
move bodies, then it cannot be sufficient reason to deny BODIES that Descartes thinks it is 
mysterious how bodies move bodies.  Again, the cases against BODIES and MINDS are 
equally powerful. 
 Hence, Descartes can hold that having the power to move bodies is a modification 
of extension and he can hold that it is a modification of thinking and, in both cases, we do 
not understand how this can be.  No one, by contrast, wonders how being square can be a 
modification of extension or the property of drawing an inference can be a modification 
of thinking.  The power to move a body, unlike the properties being square or drawing an 
inference, is a brute modification of extension and thinking, one where we do not 
understand how the one property is a modification of the other. 
 Now there is a problem.  I believe there is a very strong case for BODIES and also 
a case—less strong but not negligible—that the power to move bodies would be a brute 
modification of extension.19  Say that he thinks the power to move bodies is a brute 
modification of extension.  Why allow just that one brute modification?  Why not say that 
being a thinking thing is a brute modification of being extended?  Why not say that being 
yellow is a brute modification of being extended?  Or that heaviness is a brute 
modification of it?  Descartes does not say any of these things. He has good reason for 
                                                           
18 Cf. Platt (2011b): 850-852 which formulates the argument and compellingly replies. 
19 Clatterbaugh makes a case for ascribing a belief in brute causal powers to Descartes though he stops 
short of endorsing it ((1999): 42).  Cf. Clarke (2006): 269. 
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not saying them, but what he says instead—minds are immaterial, no bodies are colored, 
there is no real quality of heaviness—leads to mystery. 
At any rate, whether or not Descartes thinks the power to move bodies is a brute 
modification of extension, if he accepts that minds move bodies, he at least accepts that 
the power to move bodies is a brute modification of thought.  Otherwise, when Elizabeth 
or More or whomever asked how mind can move body, he would have explained.  So, if 
MINDS is true, there is at least one brute modification.  This is a problem for Descartes.  
BODIES doesn’t make it worse.20 
The argument of this section has been byzantine so it is worth summarizing it here 
at the end.  I considered a final objection to my argument for 
PARITY—If Descartes is committed to the thesis that minds move bodies, 
he is committed to the thesis that bodies move bodies  
 
That argument included this premise: 
The sort of evidence Descartes has telling against the thesis that bodies 
move bodies tells against the thesis that minds move bodies. 
 
The objection to this premise goes: 
It is hard to see how essentially merely extended things move bodies. 
It is not hard to see how essentially merely thinking things move bodies.  
Hence, 
                                                           
20 Does it make it better?  Descartes could accept brute modifications having to do with causal powers—
and only causal powers—in general. 
 The limits of our conceptual powers when it comes to understanding causation are flagged in the 
conversation with Burman (AT V 163; CSMK: 346).  This bit of correspondence is important for two 
additional reasons: When Descartes says “it is very difficult to explain” how minds move bodies, this is an 
evasive way of saying he has no idea.  (He’d have said so otherwise.)  So he is denying the validity of this 
implication: 
It is hard to see why X.  Hence, 
X isn’t the case. 
 
To boot, he explicitly accepts that bodies have effects on minds.  So, if the claim that bodies are 
“passive” includes the claim that bodies lack causal powers, Descartes is rejecting that claim.  (He does so, 
too, in the Meditations.) 
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Descartes has a sort of evidence against body-body causation—evidence 
from unintelligibility—that isn’t evidence against mind-body causation. 
Hence, 
It’s not true that the sort of evidence Descartes has telling against the 
thesis that bodies move bodies tells against the thesis that minds move 
bodies. 
 
This objection is obviously hopeless.  It’s invalid: From what is hard to see—hard for us 
or in general—nothing follows about the evidence Descartes has.  He might not have 
found it hard to see how essentially merely extended things move bodies and, in fact, 
there is evidence that that is the case.  Also, the second premise is quite obviously not 
true: For Descartes, for me, for Descartes’s correspondents, in general, it is hard to see 
how essentially merely thinking things move bodies. 
Nevertheless, the objection is on to something important, something like: 
It is harder for Descartes to see how bodies move bodies than to see how 
minds do. Hence, 
Descartes has a sort of evidence against body-body causation that isn’t 
evidence against mind-body causation.  Hence, 
It’s not true that the sort of evidence Descartes has telling against the 
thesis that bodies move bodies tells against the thesis that minds move 
bodies. 
 
And the case for the first premise here is something like: Bodies are inert.  Minds are 
active.  Since activity is a necessary condition for moving a body, it is at least in that way 
easier to see how minds move bodies than bodies do.21  First, again, the evidence in 
                                                           
21 Even if in one way it is easier to see how minds move bodies, there might be other ways that make it 
easier to see how bodies move bodies.  And in some ways it is easier.  Reiterating something that came up 
in §1, I have been defending not just that bodies have causal powers and not just that they have effects on 
other bodies and not just that these effects include moving other bodies.  I have been defending that 
Descartes allows bodies to initiate motion.  All that is needed to defend the thesis that bodies move bodies 
is an instance of a body moving another.  Such an instance needn’t involve initiating motion.  It could 
simply be deflecting, blocking, glancing, and so on.  These instances of body-body causation seem much 
easier to explain in terms of extension, than, say starting the chain of motion in the first place.  But if 
bodies deflect bodies, then that bodies move bodies is true.  Is it really so hard to see how something 
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support of the alleged difficulty is not typically from considerations about what was hard 
for Descartes to see.  Second, most importantly, the objection—the italicized “inert,” 
really—begs the question against those who endorse BODIES.  What they hold is precisely 
that Descartes holds that bodies aren’t inert insofar as that claim just amounts to bodies 
not have causal power.  Merely extended?  Of course.  But that, they hold, is compatible 
with being able to move other bodies about. 
 
7 
Those who ascribe occasionalism to Descartes can accept PARITY.  They can then reject  
BODIES—He is committed to the thesis that bodies move bodies, 
and, hence, reject 
MINDS—Descartes is committed to the thesis that minds move bodies. 
Indeed, part of my case for PARITY might seem to support occasionalism since I have 
drawn attention to several aspects of Descartes’s case for minds moving bodies and 
against bodies moving bodies that make the thesis that minds move bodies fit 
uncomfortably in Descartes’s system. 
And there is a powerful consideration I have left out: Descartes believes that the 
world persists because God continually preserves it.  It is unclear how the preservation 
works, but one idea is that God constantly recreates the world, constantly making anew 
my body, mind, computer keyboard, and each of yours, and so on.  An argument against 
the thesis that bodies move bodies now suggests itself.  The argument has been discussed 
                                                           
extended could deflect something else?  (There is an issue about solidity here, but in the debate about 
Descartes and BODIES that issue is typically left to the side.) 
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in detail in many places.22 
If the world is constantly being recreated, then “motion” is really just God 
(re)creating bodies in different places at different times.  Take what seems to be a billiard 
ball pushing another billiard ball.  At t1, the first approaches the second.  At t2, they 
collide, the first seeming to push the second.  At t3, they veer off.  What is really going on 
is that, at t1, God creates the first ball at p1 and the second at p2.  At t2, he creates both at 
p2.  At t3, he creates the first at p3, the second at p4.  And so on.  Inasmuch as this is 
motion at all, it is caused only by God.  Hence, bodies do not move bodies.  Hence, if 
Descartes goes for the divine recreation theory of divine preservation, then, so long as he 
saw its implications for causation, BODIES is false.  Whether Descartes holds the divine 
recreation theory is controversial,23 but let us assume that he does.  If so, the claim that 
the motion of the billiard balls is caused only by God comes from the claim that all 
motion is caused by God because all motion is really just God (re)creating bodies in 
different places at different times.  From that premise, though, it follows that minds don’t 
move bodies.  Each putative case of a human mind moving a body is really just a case of 
God creating a mind in some state and then creating a body in some state.  For example, 
at t1, God creates a mind willing an arm to rise.  At t2, he creates the arm rising.  Insofar 
as this is motion at all, it is caused only by God.  So if the argument shows that bodies 
fail to move bodies, it equally well shows that minds fail to do so, too.  It tells equally 
against the two views and so obviously that it is incredible that Descartes could have 
                                                           
22 See, among others, La Forge’s views (reported in Nadler (1998)), Kemp Smith (1953), Hatfield (1977), 
Garber (1987), Garber (1992a) and (1992b), Bennett (2001), Gorham (2004), Machamer and McGuire 
(2009), and Ott (2009).  Kemp Smith, La Forge, and Ott, at least, think the argument leads to 
occasionalism. 
23 Garber (1992a) explains and assesses the controversy. 
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missed it.  This is further support for PARITY and, in particular, the premise in the 
argument for it according to which the sort of evidence that tells against the thesis that 
bodies move bodies tells against the thesis that minds move bodies.  Those who think 
Descartes goes for occasionalism think Descartes endorses the argument, sees it tells 
against mind-body and body-body causation, and, hence, hold that MINDS and BODIES are 
false. 
Having established PARITY and ignoring the possibility that BODIES is true but 
MINDS is false, I prefer MINDS and BODIES to neither BODIES nor MINDS just because the 
texts are overwhelmingly supportive of the former, I think.  This is evidence that 
Descartes’s system makes room for both. 
Just as Descartes says many times and very clearly that minds move bodies, he 
says many times and very clearly that bodies move bodies.  He says throughout his 
scientific work but also in passages from metaphysical work and correspondence on 
causation.24  I think the best explanation of this is that Descartes saw that his system 
implies that bodies move bodies and, hence, commits to that thesis. 
Some of the texts endorsing or implying that bodies move bodies—selections 
from the Principles, the Meditations, and the correspondence—have been mentioned.  
There are more. 
 In correspondence with More, Descartes, immediately after claiming that 
                                                           
24 Margaret Wilson and John Cottingham take Descartes’s repeated assertions that bodies move bodies at 
face value and, hence, go for BODIES.  See Wilson (1999): 68, fn. 70 and Cottingham (1997): 160, 161-162. 
Compare with Rozemond (1999) on whether Descartes believes that bodies have mental effects.  
Rozemond cogently argues that Descartes’s claims that they do should be taken at face value and not 
reconstrued as loose talk.  “Descartes’s use of causal language could perhaps be dismissed if he ever denied 
that the body serves as a cause in sensation (or that it served as a cause under any circumstance).  After all, 
Malebranche spoke of occasional causes in the created world but he argues that the creation has no genuine 
causal powers.  But Descartes never does anything of the sort” (459).  Neither does he in the body-body 
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everything about bodies can be explained mechanically, holds that it is no disgrace to 
think that immaterial minds move bodies.  What he is getting at is that we understand 
how bodies move bodies, and, though we don’t understand how minds do it, we can be 
confident that they do, too (AT V 344 and 347; CSMK: 374-375).25 
Writing to More, Descartes explains the movements of animals by positing animal 
spirits that force the bodies of animals about.  This contrasts, Descartes thinks, with our 
own movements which are caused not entirely by spirits—by bodies—but partly by our 
minds (AT V 276; CSMK: 365).26 
 The passage exemplifies a type of maneuver Descartes uses elsewhere.  He 
frequently endorses that minds move bodies while at the same time endorsing that bodies 
do so. The thrust is that just as bodies move bodies, so, too, do minds do so.  He does so 
more than once to More.  Not only in the above passage but also when he claims that 
some motions of our limbs “are caused not by the soul but simply by the machinery of 
the body” (AT V 344; CSMK: 374).27 
                                                           
case.  The texts against BODIES aren’t explicit denials of the thesis that bodies move bodies. 
25 More himself may have rejected BODIES.  In “Responsio ad Fragmentum Cartesii,” he asserts that 
Descartes’s view is that “there is some external power, whether from God or from some incorporeal 
substance created by God, whereby matter is aroused into motion” (AT V 646-647; my emphasis). That the 
only external forces More singles out are immaterial suggests he denies BODIES. 
 Gabbey (1982) is a dazzling account of More’s views on Descartes. 
26 Descartes writes, “Since we believe there is a single principle within us that causes these movements—
namely, the soul…—we do not doubt that such a soul can be found in animals.  I came to realize, however, 
that there are two different principles causing our movements.  The first is purely mechanical and 
corporeal, and depends solely on the force of the spirits and the structure of the organs, and can be called 
the corporeal soul.  The other, an incorporeal principle, is the mind…” (AT V 276; CSMK: 365) 
27 These passages from the More correspondence are important, I think, because they counterbalance 
another passage in that correspondence that supports the denial of BODIES.  Descartes writes, explaining the 
movement of bodies, “[a body] receives an impulse from God” (AT V 404; CSMK: 381) and then singles 
out other things that can impel bodies—our minds and unnamed other causes, probably angels—but doesn’t 
single out bodies.  (This is the only passage I know of in the correspondence that provides evidence that 
Descartes holds that God shoves matter around (cf. Cottingham (1997)).)  About this passage, Garber 
writes, “If Descartes really thought bodies could be causes of motion like God, us, and probably angels, I 
suspect he would have included them explicitly in the answer to More; if bodies could be genuine causes of 
motion, this would be too important a fact to pass unnoticed” (Garber (1992b): 321). 
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 So, too, he tells Gibieuf that animal bodies cause in animals what imagination 
causes in us (AT III 479-480; CSMK: 203-204). 
 He tells Hyperaspistes that, just as bodies affect our brain, so, too, do our minds 
(AT III 424-425; CSMK: 190). 
 In the Description of the Human Body, Descartes’s purpose is to “enable us to 
know distinctly what there is in each of our actions which depends only on the body and 
what there is which depends on the soul” (AT II 227; CSM I: 316). The dependence here 
is causal dependence, and Descartes is clearly assuming that some actions depend on the 
body, some on the mind. 
If PARITY is false and Descartes holds that minds move bodies but bodies don’t, 
the above are somewhat bizarre passages since Descartes truly means that minds move 
bodies but is speaking loosely when he says that bodies move bodies.  Also, they are 
trouble for the occasionalist interpretation of Descartes since endorsing occasionalism 
would be a satisfactory response to some of the worries Descartes is responding to.  But 
in none of these letters does he endorse it. 
Finally, Descartes writes that Elizabeth falls into error by trying “to conceive the 
way in which the soul moves the body by conceiving the way in which one body is 
moved by another”  (AT III 666; CSMK: 218).  A few lines later, he complains that “We 
have hitherto confused the notion of the soul’s power to act on the body with the power 
                                                           
 Unsurprisingly, my view is that the failure to single out bodies as movers of bodies is not 
particularly important.  I think Descartes is taking that bodies move bodies for granted since the rest of the 
correspondence has established it.  Even several lines later, I think, Descartes does mention that bodies can 
be genuine causes of motion since he reminds More that “force is applied [to bodies] at different times to 
different parts of matter in accordance with the laws set out in [Principles II]” (AT V 405; CSMK: 382).  
Since I think those laws endorse that bodies move bodies, I think Descartes is singling out bodies as causes 
here.  Of course, since Garber reads the Principles differently, this won’t persuade him. 
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one body has to act on another” (AT III 667; CSMK: 219).  If BODIES is false, these 
quotations are extremely misleading since the first presupposes that there is some way in 
which one body moves another, the second that bodies have power to act on one another. 
When Elisabeth asks Descartes how minds or an incorporeal God move bodies, he 
does not question her presupposition that bodies can move bodies.28  Garber argues that 
Descartes made a mistake in not doing so (Garber (1983): 186-188).  That Descartes 
didn’t say what Garber thinks he ought to have said seems to me to be evidence that 
BODIES is true.   
Further evidence against Garber’s interpretation is that the mistake Garber thinks 
Descartes makes here is one he also makes with More.  He responds to More’s question 
about how an incorporeal substance can move a body (AT V 404-405; CSMK: 381-382).  
More implies that he understands how bodies can move bodies.  The stress in his question 
is on how an incorporeal thing can move a corporeal thing.  If More thought he did not 
understand how bodies move bodies, his question would just have been: how does 
anything move a body?  That is not what More asks, though, and to his actual question 
Descartes just insists that incorporeal things can move bodies.  This is some support for 
BODIES.  If Descartes denies that bodies move bodies, this response to More is misleading 
and needlessly weak.  He should point out that More has a false presupposition, namely, 
that there is no problem understanding how bodies move bodies, and, thus, More’s 
position is just as mysterious as that an incorporeal mind moves a body.   
And note that the response Descartes gives Elisabeth seems to be one he is 
reasonably happy with.  At least, in a 1641 letter to Hyperaspistes, Descartes says that 
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immaterial minds, like material bodies, move bodies, just as he says this in his later 
correspondence with Elisabeth.  He then, in the letter to Hyperaspistes, uses the same 
imagery to make mind-body causation acceptable that he uses with Elisabeth (AT III 
424-425 and 434; CSMK: 190 and 197). 
In sum, Descartes’s texts—largely, almost wholly—support BODIES.29  Unlike 
Malebranche on causation, there is almost no evidence that Descartes’s repeated 
assertions of the claim that bodies move bodies or of theses that imply it are not to be 
taken at face value.  The only evidence I know of is the material from the Principles and 
the correspondence with Elisabeth, More, and Regius flagged above. 
Again, the point isn’t that Descartes’s talk of bodies moving bodies guarantees 
BODIES.  Malebranche clearly denies that bodies move bodies while also going in for 
much talk of bodies moving bodies.  However, Malebranche clearly denies that bodies 
move bodies.  Descartes never does.30  Moreover, while those who hold that Descartes is 
an occasionalist are in position to argue that Descartes’s causal talk is not to be taken at 
face value, those who hold MINDS, reject PARITY, and deny BODIES should be wary of 
doing so.  Doing so leaves them open to the charge that the textual evidence in favor of 
MINDS is misleading. 
 
8 
                                                           
28 See the letters of May 21, 1643 (AT III 665; CSMK: 218) and June 28, 1643 (AT III 691-694; CSMK: 
227-228). 
29 Besides the Principles passages and letters to More quoted earlier, I believe the best textual evidence that 
BODIES is false is a 1641 letter to Regius in which Descartes claims, “Length, breadth, and depth, and the 
power of receiving all kinds of shapes and motions cannot be taken from matter…any more than thought 
can be taken from mind” (AT III 455; CSMK: 199; my emphasis).  The lack of the assertion that bodies 
have the power to produce motion is, when set next to the assertion that they have the power to be moved, 
quite striking. 
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My argument for  
BODIES—Descartes is committed to the thesis that bodies move bodies 
differs from others’.  Unlike Della Rocca’s, it involves no close textual analyses to reveal 
Descartes’s support for the thesis that bodies move bodies.  Unlike Gabbey’s and 
Gueroult’s, it involves no physical explanation of force.  Unlike Hattab’s, Pessin’s, 
Platt’s, and Schmaltz’s, it involves no spelling out of the metaphysics of causation.   
Rather, the argument is that  
MINDS—Descartes is committed to the thesis that minds move bodies  
stands and falls with BODIES, and, since MINDS stands, so does BODIES.  The reasons 
Descartes has to deny that bodies move bodies—stemming from the unintelligibility of 
body-body causation or its badness of fit with the rest of his metaphysics—are equally 
reasons to deny that minds move bodies.  The sort of reason he has to hold that minds 
move bodies—stemming from sense perception and from the senses’ importance in 
protecting the mind-body union—equally support that bodies move bodies. 
 The argument asserts 
PARITY—If Descartes is committed to the thesis that minds move bodies, 
he is committed to the thesis that bodies move bodies. 
 
If that premise is true, the standard view according to which MINDS is true, Bodies isn’t is 
false and unstable.  If it is true, it might be useful to those who see Descartes as an 
occasionalist.  They could use it to show that the reasonably common view that BODIES is 
false proves the very uncommon view that MINDS is false, too. 
My argument, by contrast, uses MINDS and PARITY to prove BODIES.  The 
                                                           
30 Cottingham (1997), Della Rocca (1999), and Platt (2011b) emphasize this. 
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argument for MINDS came from Descartes’s repeated claims that the senses establish that 
minds move bodies.  Some might think sense evidence is not, by Descartes’s own lights, 
good evidence, but Descartes so clearly holds that minds move bodies, I think, that he 
must think it is good evidence for the thesis that minds move bodies. The senses have 
some role to play in justifying causal beliefs.  They justify that minds and bodies move 
bodies, for example.  What enables them to play this role without being able to justify 
various other metaphysical claims?  Which other claims can they justify?  I sketched the 
start of an answer: The senses are designed to protect the mind-body union and 
perceiving body-body and mind-body causation, Descartes thinks, is crucial to doing so. 
Finally, whether or not my argument for it is sound, if BODIES is true, that is an 
important result.  It would cast doubt on the soundness of this familiar line of thought: 
Descartes holds bodies are essentially merely extended.  Hence, 
He holds they are inert.  Hence, 
He holds that they move no bodies. 
 
If BODIES is true, the conclusion is false.  At least one of the inferences is invalid, I think. 
 Also, if BODIES is true, it might be that the power of bodies to move bodies is a 
brute power, a feature of bodies that is a modification of extension but one which we 
can’t understand.  There is evidence that this isn’t the case.  As I noted, in the Principles, 
Descartes boasts that it is easy enough to explain how bodies move bodies.  And there is 
no explicit statement of the bruteness of body-body causation.  Nevertheless, many 
commentators have had terrible trouble seeing how to explain how an essentially merely 
extended thing might move another thing. 
But they have had trouble, too, seeing how an unextended thing might move an 
extended thing, and, I believe, Descartes quite clearly believes unextended things do 
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move extended things.  So MINDS and BODIES raise fundamental questions about 
Descartes’s metaphysics and epistemology. Our inability to understand how something 
could be the case is sometimes sufficient, Descartes believes, to reject that that thing is 
the case.  It is sufficient, Descartes believes, to reject that there are various real qualities.  
But clearly the unintelligibility of a merely thinking thing moving a body is insufficient 
to reject that such things do move bodies.  Why not?  More generally, when it comes to 
moving bodies there are limits on what we can explain.  Why any limit?  Where are these 
limits, exactly?  Why there? 
 One possibility is that the power to move is a power of the mind-body union and, 
generally, Descartes thinks that certain features of the union are unintelligible to us.  But 
this is both a mistake—the power is a power of minds rather than the union—and a cop-
out—it wishes away a problem Descartes should deal with.  He might deal with the 
problem by claiming that causal powers in general are brute features of whichever things 
have those powers.  If so, the limits of rationalism are not drawn at the mind-body border 
but, rather, wherever a mind or body meets another.31 
                                                           
31 There is a connection here with Descartes’s views on personal identity.  If Descartes holds what Wilson 
calls the “natural institution theory” of personal identity, the union of the mind and body just is the causal 
interaction between them (Wilson (1978)).  If so, the bafflingness of certain powers and the bafflingness of 
the mind-body union are quite closely connected. 
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